Media, Pinochet, and Allende
The case study of Chile provides interesting analysis of Latin American consumption in media. Historically, media’s influence in the overthrow of Salvador Allende and the coup of Pinochet is undeniable, illuminating the voracious desire for colonial consumption by the US and the willingness of the Chilean elite to welcome it. No newspaper was more influential than El Mercurio. This newspaper, according to the Pinochet file, had direct ties to the exploits of Kissinger and the CIA in its efforts to negatively propagandize Allende and bring about his overthrow. In this way, the consumption of Latin America, by readers of El Mercurio both domestically and abroad, was skewed and biased toward US interests. The New York Times article chronicles the blatant denial of human rights abuses during the Pinochet regime, which are now widely known and documented. I was surprised by the acknowledgement of the connection of the Edwards family to the NYT, and I appreciated the transparency of the reporter in chronicling the the shadow and light of Mr. Edwards’ involvements.
The contrast in marketing strategies between pro-Allende and pro-Pinochet/US forces deserves exploration. While the Pinochet/military/US marketing strategy depended on heavy subsidy from the US (see the Pinochet file), the Allende efforts “relied mostly on the graffiti and muralist brigades, led by the Chilean surrealist painter Roberto Matta.” Allende’s strategy played to his supporters, who were mostly proletariat in cities with little access to newspaper or telecommunications. However, “the voice of poets, folk-rock singers” and of course the painters could be seen in working-class neighborhoods and heard with relative ease. By the late 1960s, radio technology was widely available, so most Chileans had access to campaigns of these types. The US/military/Pinochet efforts played to their electorate as well. Newspapers like El Mercurio benefitted primarily from elite readership, and the use of international funding streams and political/intelligence networks is a historically right wing strategy. Further, the emphasis on military involvement made international collaboration through arms supplementation a natural outcome. This distinction is largely why the Decision 70 television effort was a backfire, since the television audience would largely consist of an anti-Allende electorate.
The contrast in marketing strategies between pro-Allende and pro-Pinochet/US forces deserves exploration. While the Pinochet/military/US marketing strategy depended on heavy subsidy from the US (see the Pinochet file), the Allende efforts “relied mostly on the graffiti and muralist brigades, led by the Chilean surrealist painter Roberto Matta.” Allende’s strategy played to his supporters, who were mostly proletariat in cities with little access to newspaper or telecommunications. However, “the voice of poets, folk-rock singers” and of course the painters could be seen in working-class neighborhoods and heard with relative ease. By the late 1960s, radio technology was widely available, so most Chileans had access to campaigns of these types. The US/military/Pinochet efforts played to their electorate as well. Newspapers like El Mercurio benefitted primarily from elite readership, and the use of international funding streams and political/intelligence networks is a historically right wing strategy. Further, the emphasis on military involvement made international collaboration through arms supplementation a natural outcome. This distinction is largely why the Decision 70 television effort was a backfire, since the television audience would largely consist of an anti-Allende electorate.
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